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Abstract 
This short essay will seek to address whether we are capable of being altruistic. The essay will 
start with a discussion of the definition of altruism both from a modern language and theoretical 
perspective before moving on to discuss the ways in which economists have attempted to 
capture altruism and concluding with a general discussion. The results suggest behavioural 
economists have as yet been unable to explain acts of kindness purely in altruistic terms and 
instead have elements of other motivations. That does not however suggest that we are not 
capable which incidentally may or may not be true, but given current experimental methods we 
are yet to be successful in isolating strong altruism. 
Altruism 
The Oxford English Dictionary (Paperback) defines altruism as "unselfish concern for other 
people" (Oxford English Dictionary, 2006, pp.20). It originates from the Italian 'alttrui' meaning 
somebody else. To the authors of this work it appears that the definition of selfish and how this 
is defined is key to answering this question. The same source defines selfish as "concerned 
mainly with your own needs and wishes" (OED, 2006, pp.683). Needs and wishes are likewise 
defined as "want something because it is essential or important" (OED, 2006, pp.501) and "to  
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feel a need or desire to have or do" (OED, 2006, pp.863). Similarly the body of literature on 
altruism defines this as: “Not abject self-sacrifice, but merely a willingness to act in the 
consideration of the interests of other persons, without the need of ulterior motives” (Thomas 
Nagel, 1970, p.79). 
 
Traditionally economists like to model the psychological processes of agents in terms of 
expected utility1 where utility (or utils) is a quantified measure of gain/satisfaction from 
consumption of material goods. Doing a good deed therefore does not involve any material 
consumption and in this sense satisfies the definition of altruism. All-in utility (Zizzo, 2000) 
however is not constrained by the same materiality condition therefore if an individual gains 
some utils from the act (referred to as warm glow (Andreoni, 1990)) then this is not pure 
altruism. Conversely the same solution is arrived at if there is a penalty (dis-utils) in their utility 
function2 such as guilt associated with turning a blind eye to a fellow human in need -- inequity 
aversion, (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Therefore if an individual were to rationally stop help 
(assuming the cost of doing so is less than the disutility associated with doing nothing) then the 
individual is motivated by self-interest and therefore cannot be altruistic.  
 
Experimental Economics – Measuring Altruism 
 
Behavioural economists have attempted to use a variety of games to capture altruism, the most 
widely-used of which are the Ultimatum, Dictator and Trust Game. Each of these and their 
variations are conducted in experimental labs with test subjects. The Ultimatum Game (Guth et 
al., 1982) involves two participants who are randomly paired without complete information of 
who the other is paired with in a group of experimental subjects.  The dictator (proposer) is 
given an endowment of experimental credits and then decides how much (if any) to allocate to 
the recipient (responder). These are subsequently exchanged at the end of the experiment into 
real monetary values. With knowledge of the dictator’s proposal the recipient now decides 
whether or not accept or reject. If the recipient chooses to accept then both parties receive 
what was proposed by the dictator. If however the recipient chooses to reject the dictator’s 
allocation both participants receive 0. Assuming both players are rational and are only 
                                                          
1
 There is a substantial literature on Expected Utility, its alternatives and rationality although this has been 
omitted for the purposes of clarity.  
2
 A deterministic way of expressing the happiness an individual feels for a certain event. 
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interested in their associated payoffs the dictator will reason that as long as his offer is strictly 
greater than 0 then the recipient should agree, maximizing their respective earnings. The 
dictator should therefore offer the smallest denomination of experimental credits and the 
recipient should accept.  
 
What we find is that although this result is observed in some instances the majority offer 
between 40-60% of their endowment. Offers below 40% are often accompanied with a high rate 
of rejection. (e.g. Cameron, 1999; Croson 1996; Eckel and Grossman, 2001;) Fairness and 
inequity aversion are often used to justify why recipients reject as the negative utility from 
accepting offers below 40% are greater than the utility associated with the monetary payoff to 
the recipient, leading to the recipients to reject the allocation. It is however curious as to why 
dictators propose offers of more than 40%. One reason may be due to inequity aversion (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999) in that individuals are adverse to offers that are less than ‘fair’. Other 
academics have also attempted to explain this by extending the number of periods in which 
participants are paired. The results suggest that through learning effects we observe some 
convergence to 40% although some dictators still offer consistently more than this. 
 
Several reasons in addition to altruism have been proposed to explain this effect these are 
namely: inequity aversion, warm glow and experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010). 
Considering inequity aversion, the dictator may have only shared the material payoff to her co-
player because an unfair proposal would generate substantial negative utilities above those 
associated with a greater material payoff. 3 Alternatively if we consider warm glow, in sharing 
the allocation more equally the individual may gain positive utilities above that which would 
have been generated from receiving a higher material payoff. Finally, experimenter demand 
effects may influence individual decisions and result in a higher incidence of sharing either 
because of experimenter scrutiny or because the participants act in a way the experimenters 
would hope to see.  
 
The Dictator Game (Kahneman et al., 1986) is a variant of the Ultimatum Game but with no 
avenue of recourse for the recipient when faced with the dictators’ proposal. The dictator is 
                                                          
3
 ψ =−α (v−u) if v ≥ u and ψ=−β (u−v) if v ≤u, 0<α <β, or the difference between the dictator and his/her 
co-player’s material payoffs will decrease the dictators all-in utilities, the dictator will choose to share 
some material payoffs to his/her co-player to avoid this decrease. 
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given an endowment of experimental credits and then decides how much (if any) to allocate to 
the recipient. Rational self-interested individuals would deduce that the recipient has no 
recourse to object to the dictator’s decision and therefore should allocate 0 to the recipient. 
Although this result is witnessed in test conditions not all agents allocate 0. Of those that do not 
allocate 0 the dictator gives on average 40% of their endowment to the recipient. Some have 
tried to verify this result by turning the game from a one-shot game to multiple periods, keeping 
the allotted dictators and recipients constant throughout. Regardless of adding additional 
periods the mean does not converge (fully) to 0. This result suggests something systematic in 
the way dictators are choosing to allocate their endowment.  As we saw in the ultimatum game 
similarly inequity aversion, warm glow and experimenter demand effects have also been 
proposed to explain this result in addition to altruism. 
 
The trust game proposed by Berg, Dickhunt and McCabe (1995) like the previous two involves 
two participants who are randomly paired in a group of participants without knowledge of who 
the other is paired with. One participant is then allocated as the investor (truster) and the other 
the recipient (trustee). The investor is then given an endowment of experimental credits and 
then decides how much (if any) to invest. Usually the amount invested is then multiplied by 
some factor and transferred to the recipient. The recipient then decides how much if any to 
return to the investor. Fully rational investors would deduce that self-interested recipients will 
return 0 maximizing their payoff over a one period game, although both could do jointly better if 
they invested. Extending the game to multiple periods rational agents should reason the same 
by backwards induction. Suppose the trust game runs for 10 periods then the most rational 
thing for a self-interested profit-maximizing recipient to do is to return 0. An investor will reason 
this and therefore invest 0 on the ultimate round. The recipient reasoning this would therefore 
return 0 on the penultimate round and so forth. 
 
What we find is that although this result is observed, many participants establish trust in the 
initial rounds only defaulting in the penultimate rounds. In some cases trust and fulfilling is also 
maintained throughout the whole experiment. Jacobsen and Sadrieh (1996) found participants 
invested 60% and were repaid 110%. Koford (1998) found the participants invested 70% and got 
150% back. As with the previous two cases the results found in these experiments cannot be 
explained purely with altruism. Aside form inequity aversion, warm glow and experimenter 
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demand effects there are at least two other explanations. The first is ‘kindness reciprocity’ and 
the second is ‘trust responsiveness’. Kindness reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 
2001) occurs when a recipient reciprocates the trust of the trustee in returning some of the 
investment. ‘Trust responsiveness’ (Bacharach and Zizzo, 2007) occurs when the recipient fulfils 
this trust because they believe the investor trusts them. The more she believes so, the more she 
is going to fulfil the investor.  
 
In summary we cannot explain the results purely with altruism instead we must use this in 
conjunction with other reasons. This may be because we do not yet possess the methodology to 
isolate pure altruism from individual players or simply it does not exist. It is however likely that 
some form of altruism may exist as in any experiment as in real life there will be differences 
between individuals and their underlying motivations.    
  
Philosophical Incites and General Discussion 
 
Experimental results aside it can however be argued that it is unreasonable to expect an 
individual to commit a purely altruistic act/action without some form of gain whether this be 
material or otherwise. Even if the individual commits an act that appears purely altruistic due to 
human, computational or forecasting errors (and it is inconceivable that an individual can gain 
from it), they are likely to have taken this action due to self-interested reasoning. Critiques of 
this would likely bring forth notable examples such as Nelson Mandela to name one but a few as 
an example of altruism. Or can it? It would be hard to refute that his fame has not allowed him a 
much more extravagant lifestyle than that which can be obtained through work. Notable 
examples aside it is important to remember altruism may come in many different forms such as 
someone who holds down three jobs and does his/her best for their family and still has the time 
to help a stranger in need. Although even here it may be argued that this individual has a vested 
interest in their children (sunk costs) and may help a stranger due to inequity aversion. 
In the Wealth of Nations Adam Smith (attributed as the father of economics and by some of 
behavioural economics) commented about the idea that an individual may sympathize with 
another individual/being when they are experiencing a bad turn of events, due partly to we 
imagining ourselves in their shoes. Again this can be explained at least in part through inequity 
aversion. There may also even be something biological in why we respond this way which may 
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have allowed us to feel compassion for our own (as long as the risks to the individual are not too 
great) and in that way bolstered the species survival as a whole.  
This essay has been primarily focused on interpreting the question as whether or not we are 
capable of committing an act without some form of gain. If the question is purely concerned 
with whether or not we are ‘physically’ capable of committing an altruistic act by error or 
otherwise then we must surely believe this is possible. Key to the argument presented above is 
whether or not we can indeed separate the ‘act of altruism’ from the ‘belief system’. In essence 
separating the act from whether an individual believes they are doing a good deed
4
.  
Conclusion 
 
This short essay aimed to address whether or not we are capable of being altruistic. The 
question itself was broad and could be interpreted in a number of different ways. For example if 
we are to purely consider whether we are ‘physically’ capable of committing an altruistic act 
then we firmly agree with this view. If we are to consider the deeper issue of whether an 
individual would purposely commit an altruistic act we find no justification. The evidence 
presented within the main body of this essay suggests we cannot dispute altruism as possible 
justification for what we observe but the results can also be explained by other motivations. We 
do not yet have the methodology to isolate altruism. Indeed this may even be unattainable. In 
the meantime we must look to other disciplines for insights into this problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
4
 One would be justified in looking at relativism and determinism here, although these were omitted as 
the authors felt this was steering too far into the realm of philosophy in which neither author is well 
equipped to navigate.  
30 
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